Hammer v. Dagenhart
247 U.S. 251 (1918)
Constitutional Topic Areas:
Article I §8 Clause 3 ‘Commerce Clause’, 14th Amendment Due Process Clause, Appellate Jurisdiction, Police Powers, Enumerated Powers, Substantive Due Process, Rational Basis Test
Case Facts:
During the early 1900s, hardly any government regulation existed for manufacturing safety, workplace conditions, or welfare regulation. Worker advocacy groups had long pressed both the federal government and individual states to use their police powers to intervene and regulate some aspects of manufacturing to improve workplace safety–namely address child labor. Congress listened and passed some acts under the Constitution’s commerce clause which explicitly enumerate Congress’ power to “…regulate commerce…among the several states…” Among these newly passed laws, the Keating-Owens Act banned goods to be sold in interstate commerce from any factory employing children under the age of fourteen. Roland Dagenhart worked in a cotton mill in North Carolina with his two minor sons which were already allowed to work up to eleven hours per day under North Carolina law. The Keating-Owen Act limited one of his son’s shifts up to a maximum length of eight hours, and the other could not work at all because of his young age. Dagenhart sued in federal court, arguing the Keating-Owen Act to be unconstitutional on the basis that child labor was purely a local matter and did not directly engage in interstate commerce. The court agreed and ruled the Keating-Owen Act unconstitutional. US Attorney William C. Hammer appealed to the Supreme Court.
Questions:
1. Does Congress have authority under Article I §8 Clause 3’s Commerce Clause to regulate child labor through the Keating-Owen Act?
Holding:
1. No
Legal Reasoning: Justice W.R. Day (5-4)
1. Congress may not use the commerce clause because ‘trade and manufacture’ are purely local matters, which are to be reserved to be regulated by states though their police powers only
2. States know best when to regulate local matters to prevent unfair competition
3. Congress exceeded its constitutional powers over interstate commerce and violated state’s reserved powers. The Keating-Owen Act is ruled unconstitutional
Dissent-Justice O.W. Holmes:
1. Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce as granted by Article I §8 Clause 3, and goods manufactured in one state and sold in a different state is the definition of interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress has the authority to regulate any part of the entire manufacturing process
2. The majority’s morality-appealing logical reasoning is inconsistent with its stance on Congress’ ban on alcohol via its commerce clause powers. The Court should use the same logical reasoning in Hamer. Congress has the authority to regulate “…strong drink but not as against the product of ruined lives.” In other words, if alcohol is bad and should be prohibited, so should products made by children who’s lives were ruined in unsafe working conditions
Significance:
In Hammer, the Supreme Court is showing off its newly found distinctions between intrastate and interstate commerce, especially regarding manufacture and production vs. distribution. This case was decided by a very narrow 5-4 vote, which inherently weakens the foundation of the case over time. This makes it much more likely for Hammer to be overruled in the future compared to a unanimous vote
Reflection:
Hammer signals a shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to the commerce clause, now beginning to strike down further uses of the commerce clause by Congress through the New Deal era. Hammer would later be overturned, effectively restoring the Keating-Owens Act in the case of US v. Darby in 1941. Overall, Hammer weakens the power of the federal government and strengthens state’s rights
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